Second report on the use of financial resources earmarked for the decommissioning of nuclear installations, spent fuel and radioactive waste. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. COM (2007) 794 final, 12 December 2007 by unknown
 
EN     EN 
 
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 12.12.2007 
COM(2007) 794 final 
  
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION 
TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 
Second Report on the use of financial resources earmarked for the decommissioning 
of nuclear installations, spent fuel and radioactive waste 
 
 
 
{SEC(2007) 1654}  
EN  2     EN 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. BACKGROUND.......................................................................................................... 3 
2. METHODOLOGY....................................................................................................... 3 
2.1.  Decommissioning Funding Group............................................................................... 3 
2.2. Studies.......................................................................................................................... 4 
2.3. External  Cooperation ................................................................................................... 4 
3. RESULTS .................................................................................................................... 4 
3.1.  Decommissioning of nuclear installations................................................................... 5 
3.2. Legislative,  Institutional  and procedural aspects......................................................... 6 
3.3. Decommissioning  Funds..............................................................................................6 
3.4.  Cost Estimation and Fund Adequacy...........................................................................7 
3.5.  Use of Funds ................................................................................................................ 7 
3.6.  New Nuclear Construction........................................................................................... 8 
3.7. Transparency................................................................................................................ 8 
3.8. Way  Forward................................................................................................................9  
4. CONCLUSIONS........................................................................................................ 10  
EN  3     EN 
1. BACKGROUND 
In October 2004, the Commission presented its first report to the European Parliament on the 
use of financial resources earmarked for the decommissioning of nuclear power plants
1. The 
report was drafted partly, as a result of concerns regarding potential safety implications 
should adequate decommissioning funds not be available when needed and concerning 
possible fund mismanagement and the potential for distortion of competition. 
The 2004 report was well received and led to an own-initiative report
2 from the European 
Parliament. It was acknowledged within the report that decommissioning was a complex issue 
and that more detailed information was required in order to progress the issues raised. With 
this in mind the Commission has completed an extensive consultation process involving 
independent technical studies (one of which included a detailed questionnaire) and detailed 
consultation with experts of the Member states. 
In addition, the Commission adopted a Recommendation
3 on decommissioning funds in 2006 
following consultation with Member State experts and taking advantage of its research in the 
field. This second report provides for a normal progression of the Commission's work 
comparing EU nuclear operators and Member States funding practice with that detailed in the 
Commission Recommendation.  
2. METHODOLOGY 
In 2004 the Commission set up an ad-hoc expert group - Decommissioning Funding Group 
(DFG) - in order to improve consultation with the Member States and to ensure better input to 
the work of the Commission. . 
2.1.  Decommissioning Funding Group 
The DFG assisted the EC in: 
1.  Promoting a clear understanding of the decommissioning policies and strategies and 
the attendant tasks and activities; 
2.  Providing an up-to-date knowledge on decommissioning cost estimates and the 
management of the provisions/funds; 
3.  Exploring the ways ahead in terms of further co-operation and harmonisation at 
European level. 
The DFG met twice and provided an open forum for the exchange of views on national 
approaches. This body was consulted during the drafting of the Commission's 2006 
Recommendation
3 on decommissioning funding. 
                                                 
1  Report on the use of financial resources earmarked for the decommissioning of nuclear power plants, 
COM(2004)719 Final of 26.10.2004 
2  European Parliament resolution on the use of financial resources earmarked for the decommissioning of 
nuclear power plants (2005/2027(INI)), P6_TA-PROV(2005)0432 
3  OJ L 330 (28.11.2006)  
EN  4     EN 
2.2. Studies 
Technical studies have been completed providing essential input to this report and addressing 
a wide range of issues related to nuclear decommissioning. The studies addressed the 
following issues: 
•  Analysis of the factors influencing the selection of strategies for decommissioning 
of nuclear installations; 
•  Decommissioning funding methodologies in the European Union; 
•  Inventory of best practices in the decommissioning of nuclear installations; 
•  Analysis of environmental, economic and social issues linked to the 
decommissioning of nuclear installations; 
Copies of the main reports for these studies can be found on the relevant Commission 
website
4. 
The response from Member States to specific requests for information and in particular the 
questionnaire varied, affecting sometimes the conclusions of the relevant study. This issue is 
further elaborated in section 3.7 of this report. 
2.3. External  Cooperation 
The Commission has continued to work with the IAEA and NEA in the field of nuclear 
decommissioning through the dedicated groups such as TEGDE
5 and WPDD
6. 
A group was established by the Working Party on Nuclear Safety as part of the Council’s 
consultation process organised under the auspices of the Council Working Party on Atomic 
Questions. The Commission services have actively participated in the work of this group 
whose work was based primarily on the results of the Commission questionnaire referred to in 
section 2.2 above. 
3. RESULTS 
The work of the Commission over the past two years reinforced considerably the general 
conclusions from 2004 that there were wide variations in decommissioning strategy and 
funding methodology across the Member States. While harmonisation can have significant 
positive political advantages, due account is taken of the potential consequences of imposing 
a one-size-fits-all policy of harmonisation. 
The Commission’s work has provided reasonable confidence that Member State operators act 
responsibly in the creation and management of decommissioning funds. There are many 
examples of good practice that can be highlighted in countries such as Finland and Sweden 
where the polluter-pays-principle is enshrined in national legislation. The new law adopted in 
                                                 
4 Web  page:  http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/index_en.htm 
5  TEGDE: Technical Group for Decommissioning (IAEA) 
6  WPDD: Working party for dismantling and decommissioning (NEA)  
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France in 2006 provides another more recent example, demonstrating awareness by 
governments of the need to address an aspect of the nuclear industry which is of clear public 
concern. 
The Commission's work has also highlighted areas of concern. Results are summarised below 
making reference to the relevant part of decommissioning fund Recommendation
3 in [] 
brackets. 
3.1.  Decommissioning of nuclear installations 
In all Member States, strategies are decided upon following an assessment of numerous 
factors ranging from cost and, availability of waste repositories, to social consequences. In no 
single case is it stated that a particular decommissioning strategy has been selected due to the 
absence of adequate funding. It is however noted that for several installations a deferral period 
has been significantly reduced following an increased availability in funding. In some 
Member States a government authority is responsible for deciding upon the decommissioning 
strategy whereas in others the decision is left to the operator subject of course to regulatory 
approval. 
Strategies are categorised according to the three basic types of immediate, deferred or 
entombment with the latter considered as a possible option but not actually foreseen in any 
EU nuclear installation. The strategy selected often varies within Member states with 
significant variations in deferral period the longest being for the UK gas graphite reactors, 
which have a final site clearance 130 years after plant closure. While the UK strategy is 
officially determined by the benefits of radioactive decay, it is to be noted that the recently 
formed government organisation (NDA) now responsible for this legacy has a stated objective 
of reducing this period to 25 years. In other Member States a strategy of immediate 
dismantling is being implemented over a relatively long timeframe (Italy, France). 
Information provided by Member States confirm that the issue of nuclear installation 
decommissioning and management of waste is addressed with activities that do not result in 
undue risk to the health and safety of workers and the general public [1,2]. 
Whatever strategy a Member State chooses for decommissioning, insufficient funding by the 
plant operator can run counter the polluter-pays principle [3]. Furthermore, it can result in an 
unjustified economic advantage, amounting to State aid which distorts competition between 
electricity producers. 
Some member States such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, and the Netherlands have opted 
for a strategy of deferred decommissioning. While there are many assessments that conclude 
that the overall cost is relatively unaffected by strategy choice, a deferred strategy does not 
require sums as large as those needed for immediate decommissioning to be made available as 
soon as a plant is shut down. It is essential, however, to ensure that the chosen mode of 
management guarantees that the financial resources will be fully available and adequate when 
required. In other countries some significant evolutions are ongoing: in the UK the NDA has 
proposed to reduce the deferral period from over 100 to 25 years. Slovakia and Bulgaria have 
both indicated an intention to move from deferred decommissioning to immediate or, as in the 
case of Kozloduy 1-4, a solution falling somewhere between the two is proposed. In such 
cases, the availability of additional funding from sources other than the operator’s fund plays 
a key role in strategy selection and long term financial security is an area that appears to 
require further development.  
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3.2. Legislative,  Institutional and procedural aspects 
In all Member states there is clear legislation in force requiring the creation of a fund with 
varying specificities regarding management and use. In France, such legislation was adopted 
in 2006 with a new law that provides a good example of best practice and makes mention in 
its explanatory memorandum of the European Commission's work in this area. 
All Member States have set up a national body [6] for the review and assessment of 
decommissioning fund management and cost estimates. The role of such bodies however, is 
rarely detailed. This is still an evolving process which needs to be closely monitored through 
the national reports foreseen in the Recommendation in order to ensure that an effective 
method of review, assessment and control is being implemented. 
3.3. Decommissioning  Funds 
Most decommissioning funds are segregated [8] with revenues obtained on the basis of 
nuclear activities – primarily through a levy – during plant operational life. There are however 
several notable variations: 
•  In several member States funding for decommissioning and waste management is 
provided by more than one system. This is the case for example in Italy, UK, 
Slovakia, Bulgaria and Lithuania. 
•  In Germany funds are held and managed internally by commercial operators. It is 
to be noted that whereas the system operated by German utilities has in the past 
been singled out for criticism by many stakeholders, this system of fund 
management has a demonstrable performance from the viewpoint of providing 
adequate funds. 
•  Shared ownership requires a specific solution to funding issues especially where 
the part-owner is from another Member State. Of particular note is for example 
the situation in Slovakia with the ENEL purchase of Slovenske Elektrene and, the 
joint responsibility between Croatia and Slovenia for the Krsko NPP. The latter 
has resulted in an under-resourced fund due to the absence of a dedicated fund in 
Croatia. Particular attention needs to be paid to the aspect of funding in future 
with proposals for new power plant construction with ownership shared by several 
countries. 
•  There are many instances where a dedicated fund has not been created but instead 
there is a basic assumption that treasury funds will be made available when 
required. While the liabilities for most installations are small compared to power 
reactors this is not the case for reprocessing and plutonium handling facilities. 
The establishment and operation of a decommissioning fund is rarely accompanied by any 
assessment of the inherent risks associated with long term operation, liability assessment, 
governance and investment. The study on decommissioning funding methodologies has 
provided a useful and rare insight into fund risk management which given the uncertainties 
that exist in these areas should be subject to further evaluation.  
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3.4.  Cost Estimation and Fund Adequacy 
There have been several attempts by International organisations aimed at comparing 
decommissioning cost estimates with a view to harmonisation in this area but, with little 
success to date. There are justified reasons why estimates may vary from one Member State to 
another due for example to manpower costs or national policy on clearance levels. Since 2004 
further detailed information has been obtained however, many operators are reluctant to 
provide all details on such calculations. 
Slovenia has a well defined fund which meets the best practice outlined in the 
Recommendation however, the responsibility for the Krsko power plant is shared with Croatia 
with the latter yet to establish a similar system. As a consequence, and through no fault of the 
Member State, only 50% of the required funding for decommissioning is currently being set 
aside. 
The Ignalina reactors in Lithuania, Bohunice V1 in Slovakia and Kozloduy Units 1-4, are 
covered by an early closure commitment negotiated as part of the EU enlargement process. 
The consequences of early closure were acknowledged during accession negotiations with the 
Community committing to provide adequate financial assistance which takes into account the 
long term nature of the subsequent decommissioning process. International funds 
administered by the EBRD have been set up and in December 2005 the Union agreed to 
significant continued Community financing over the 2007-2013 financial perspective. A 
regulation to implement this financing was adopted for Ignalina
7 in 2006 and for Bohunice in 
May 2007
8, in line with the commitment made in the relevant protocol to the Act of 
Accession. Implementation of the Community assistance to Bulgaria in respect of the 
Kozloduy units 1-4 closure is provided through the relevant Act of Accession until 2009. 
The basic assumptions made regarding discounted costs vary considerably across the EU 
which is an area that should be addressed through future harmonisation. A combination of a 
long deferral period and an inappropriate use of discounting rates give rise to a concern over 
long-term fund adequacy [13]. 
It is recognised by all operators that the decommissioning liability estimate needs to be 
reassessed over the lifetime of the installation concerned and with increasing precision. The 
uncertainties involved in this process are significant with potential for a serious shortfall in 
funds when required should it not be properly addressed. Inaccurate decommissioning cost 
estimates, poor fund performance (whether due to low return or high risk investments) are key 
concerns which require independent fund oversight at both financial and technical levels. A 
question remains as to the adequacy of such oversight in several Member States [11]. 
Insurance against early closure is only foreseen in a few cases whether as initial guarantees, 
provisions or specific insurance policies. In several Member States, it is an assumption that 
the State will underwrite any financial shortfall related to early closure problems. 
3.5.  Use of Funds 
There are several examples within the EU where financial resources are used for purposes 
other than decommissioning and waste management [15]. A particular concern arises for 
                                                 
7  OJ L 411/10 (30.12.2006) 
8  OJ L 131/1 (23.5.2007)  
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treasury funds where financial resources are not segregated with the consequent potential lack 
of long-term financial stability which is essential for safe decommissioning. In Italy, the funds 
obtained from a tariff on electricity price are placed in a State fund and the part not required 
for decommissioning used for other purposes of State interest. Approximately half of today's 
funding for civil installations in the UK is provided from the State budget based upon a three 
year commitment. The current shortfall in operating profits which provides the remaining 
funding and absence of a segregated fund results in a potential requirement to reorganise 
short-term decommissioning activities. 
Belgium has recently drafted a new law which will see decommissioning funds used to 
finance totally unrelated power investment projects in a manner which could be seen as 
preferential to the project rather than prudent fund management [16]. 
Lithuania has used in some cases its national fund to co-finance energy sector projects to 
provide replacement capacity for the early closed reactor. 
In addition, using funds intended for decommissioning purposes as a cheap financing 
resource, can lead to major distortions on the EU's internal market 
3.6.  New Nuclear Construction 
Within the EU the choice on the use of nuclear energy remains open to those Member States 
that so wish and, a significant rise in the number of new nuclear power reactors must be 
considered in assessing the need for Community action in areas such as decommissioning 
finance. 
The polluter-pays-principle requires operators to set up adequate funds which are available 
when necessary. This principle is not always strictly applied usually for well defined 
historical reasons. Following the Recommendation, no such situation should be allowed to 
occur for future constructions. Several member States have addressed this issue; in the case of 
France through new legislation and with the UK and the Netherlands expressing similar 
positions. Construction of a new power plant in Romania will be completed in 2007 with 
three other partially constructed plants foreseen for completion in the near future. The 
provisions made by Romania in order to address decommissioning liabilities are in process to 
be further defined on the basis of the recent 2006 and 2007 legislation. Several other Member 
States have expressed an intention to construct new nuclear facilities and the Commission 
needs to play a role in ensuring best funding practice is applied. 
The Commission's Recommendation [5] makes special mention of decommissioning funding 
regimes and recommends the funding modalities being reported as part of the Article 41 of the 
Euratom Treaty concerning the construction of new nuclear installations. This voluntary 
process which is without prejudice to the provisions of Article 41 of the Treaty is consistent 
with 'soft-legislation' provided by the Recommendation. This method of declaration and 
consultation will have to be assessed by the Commission in order to conclude on the need or 
not for further community legislation. 
3.7. Transparency 
The issue of transparency with regard to funding issues from both the Member States and 
individual operators needs to be assessed at the level of both cooperation and, publicly 
available information. In terms of information within the public domain the situation is far  
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from satisfactory in many member States. The UK's NDA represents an example of best 
practice in this area with its dedicated website and Lifecycle baselines which provide a major 
improvement to the level of public information normally made available. 
In general, the communication between the Commission and Member States takes place in a 
spirit of good cooperation and this situation has been significantly improved in recent years. 
The Commission has maintained the Member State as its main interlocutor but where contact 
has been made with individual operators a similar situation has been demonstrated. There are 
some notable exceptions to this situation of general good communication: 
•  Bulgaria did not reply to the Commission's questionnaire or react to specific 
requests for information. A similar remark was often provided by tenderers as 
feedback during the course of the studies. It is noted that the early closure of the 
Kozloduy 1-4 power reactors has led to important funding issues. 
•  The information provided by the UK was quite sparse especially compared to 
most Member States and disproportionate to the size of its nuclear industry. The 
detailed information made publicly available by the NDA on its website provides 
a counterweight to this criticism. 
•  Germany respond to the Commission's questionnaire some time after the study 
had been completed thereby removing an important element from the comparison 
being undertaken in one of the targeted studies. 
•  A number of operators maintain a confidentiality clause over the release of either 
liability estimates, funds collected or, both. The argument most commonly cited 
being that the information is commercially sensitive. Given the detailed 
information available in this domain and the willingness of many operators to 
provide such information, this argument is not considered valid. 
•  Romania adopted legislation which requires the creation of two segregated funds, 
one for decommissioning of nuclear facilities and the second one for spent nuclear 
fuel and radioactive waste management. Further information on the 
implementation of the new legislation will be required from Romania. 
3.8. Way  Forward 
It is to be noted that in the annex to its 2002 Communication
9 the Commission drew special 
attention to the funding systems in France and Germany as being the only cases which 
required special attention. Arguments were based upon the impact of the proposal to set up 
external funds and, the conclusion would be little affected following the last two EU 
enlargements. 
A more detailed analysis of the situation in Member States and wider consultation with 
stakeholders has resulted in a significantly different understanding of the situation. Funding 
methodology cannot be simply divided into internal or external funds; there are large 
variations in methodology and the degree of ring fencing provided by the various mechanisms 
especially in the case of external funds. Where an operator maintains full responsibility for 
                                                 
9  Nuclear safety in the European Union. COM(2002) 605 final of 6.11.2002  
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decommissioning and waste management, the operator argues for maintaining its right for the 
financial management of funds created for this purpose. This situation may be unacceptable 
and the attention should be focussed on the various factors that affect fund adequacy, liquidity 
and security and, combined with close restrictions on fund use and transparent management. 
It seems that current concerns are largely due to the lack of application of national legislative 
requirements and best practices. These concerns could be better addressed by independent 
oversight of the decommissioning funds, rather than further legislation - whether national or 
supranational.  
The recent change in relevant French law highlights the role that an external body plays in 
overseeing such issues. The reports of the Court of Auditors were influential in the changes to 
legislation and the Commission's work was also recognised in the explanatory memorandum 
that accompanied the new law. A similar strengthening of the role of external oversight can be 
perceived in other Member States. A notable feature of the new legislation is that it requires 
practice based on requirements regarding prudence and secure management which are not 
clearly defined but rather subject to independent oversight. 
The Commission is aware that there is a need for improvements to assure the availability of 
adequate funding when required and their transparent and secure management. The 
Commission will address these issues as follow-up action to the publication of the 
Recommendation together with the advisory group representing all Member States. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The decommissioning of nuclear plants is set to become an increasingly important issue in the 
years ahead. It is a fair assumption under the present policies that about one third of the 
reactors currently operating in the European Union will need to be decommissioned by 2025. 
Despite specific national legislation, there are grounds for progress in several aspects of fund 
adequacy, management and use, in particular through detailed monitoring and reporting at 
both national and EU level. 
Differences in decommissioning strategies and fund management may lead to a distortion on 
the liberalised EU energy markets. Decommissioning costs including the final disposal of the 
waste has to be seen as part of the electricity production costs and should be compatible with 
state aid rules. 
Member States need to ensure more transparency in reporting on the financial resources for 
decommissioning. Liability assessments should follow agreed accounting principles with 
publicly available estimates and provisions. 
Differences between Member States are partly due to the structure and ownership of energy 
utilities before the creation of the internal market in electricity. The liberalisation of energy 
markets has brought an increased need for transparency and more harmonisation in the 
management of these financial resources. The Commission believes it is important to continue 
the effort and the cooperation with all parties concerned. The main scope is to ensure both that 
financial resources are set aside to meet the requirements of nuclear plant decommissioning 
and that they will actually be available as and when required. The resources need to be 
managed with full transparency ensuring adequate funds for a high level of nuclear safety  
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with respect to decommissioning and radioactive waste management. The information on 
decommissioning financing cannot be retained on the basis of confidentiality. The benefits of 
harmonised decommissioning funding methodologies should be explored in the EU. This 
assessment should take into account the differences in strategies between the Member States 
avoiding compromising safety and security. Common approaches in the case of new 
constructions should be rigorously pursued. 
The Commission should focus on the adequacy of funding, its financial security and the ring 
fencing that is required in order to ensure the funds are only used for the purposes intended. 
For future nuclear constructions a common approach to methodology should be progressed 
but for currently operating systems the Commissions activities need to be based upon 
independent evaluation and reporting. 
The working document accompanying this report contains a table of accumulated funds in 
relation to total liability and plant operational lifetime. The content of the working document 
is based upon the information provided by the Member States collected via reference studies 
undertaken since 2004. Member States are requested to correct, if necessary, the information 
provided and the Commission will reissue the document at appropriate intervals. 
The accompanying working document will be used as a basis for future continued 
consultation with Member State experts. 
Sources for the information in this report can be found in the Commission's Staff Working 
Document: EU decommissioning funding data
10. 
                                                 
10 SEC(2007)  1654. 